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The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban
Governance
Richard Briffault*
I. EXIT, VOICE, AND BIG CITIES
The dominant law and economics model of local govern-
ment, based on the work of Charles M. Tiebout, assumes that
decentralization of power to local governments promotes the
efficient delivery of public goods and services. In his seminal
article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Tiebout contended
that the existence of a large number of local governments in
any given area2 permits a "market solution"3 to the question of
how to determine the level and mix of government services that
people desire. The multiplicity of local governments in an area
means that, as long as each locality is free to adopt its own mix
of services, regulations, and taxes, area residents will have a
variety of packages of local government actions to choose
among in determining where to live. An individual, as a
"consumer-voter,"4 can decide on the type and level of local
services she wishes to receive, the type of local regulation she
likes, and the local tax burden she is willing to assume by, in
effect, shopping around among various localities and moving to
the one that best suits her preferences. 5 A metropolitan area,
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation and Director of Legis-
lative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia University. I undertook the research
and writing of this article while a Visiting Fellow at the A. Alfred Taubman
Center for State and Local Government, John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University. I would like to thank the members of the Center,
and especially its director, Alan Altshuler, for their hospitality and support.
L 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
2. See id. at 419.
3. See id. at 421 (illustrating by example the ability of decentralized
governments to satisfy individuals' needs for public goods).
4. See id. at 419 (discussing the limitations and premises underlying
consumer-voter decisions).




thus, functions as a kind of "marketplace"6 in which, due to inter-
local mobility, residents are more likely to have their preferences
satisfied by local government offerings than if comparable public
goods and services were offered by higher levels of government.
The Tiebout model implies that over time the populations
of individual localities will become more homogeneous with respect
to tastes for local government actions. Like-minded people will
be drawn to localities whose packages they find appealing
while local dissenters relocate to other places where their
tastes are more likely to be accommodated. Local homogeneity
ought to reduce local internal disagreement and further increase
the likelihood that local government activities will satisfy local
residents.7 Moreover, in a system in which local governments
are heavily dependent on local resources for the revenues they
need to finance local public services,8 the consumer-voter mo-
bility central to the Tiebout model means that local govern-
ments must compete to retain their current taxpayers and to
attract new ones. This competition can provide an incentive to
local governments to hold down the costs they impose on their
residents. In the view of the advocates of decentralization of
public power to the local level "rivalry among local govern-
ments is analogous to rivalry among firms" in promoting effi-
cient government operations.9
Although Tiebout focuses on the multiplicity of local gov-
ernments, his model relies on implicit assumptions concerning
local autonomy and local size. Local governments must have
the legal authority to determine taxes, services, and regula-
tions within their jurisdiction. Otherwise the multiplicity of
local governments would not result in any diversity of local
government offerings and interlocal movement would not re-
veal any preferences for public actions. Similarly, localities
6. See Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization of Government in Metro-
politan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 831, 832 (1961)
(examining polycentric political systems from a marketplace perspective);
Robert Warren, A Municipal Services Market Model of Metropolitan Organi-
zation, 30 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 193, 196 (1964) (identifying the fundamental as-
sumptions of the municipal-services market model).
7. See ROBERT BISH, THE PUBLIC EcONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS
49-52 (1971) (discussing economic theory supporting decentralization).
8. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1129 (1996) (observing that local
property tax revenues are a primary component of local revenues).




must be small in territory and population relative to the area
as a whole so that people can change their locality of residence
without having to make other major alterations in their lives.
This increases the possibility that the choice of a community of
residence will reflect a preference about public sector actions
and not private concerns. Consistent with the premises of the
Tiebout model, American local governments enjoy considerable
autonomy,10 and most metropolitan areas are highly frag-
mented."
Like law and economics, the political argument for decen-
tralization is also closely connected to the small size of local
governments.' 2 This argument stresses the role of local gov-
ernments in facilitating citizen participation in public action. 3
The small size of local units makes it easier for citizens to voice
their views to their local government and their fellow local citi-
zens, to respond to each other's concerns, and to deliberate con-
cerning important local public matters. Small local size makes
it easier for people to gather information about local circum-
stances, local government actions, and the needs and perspec-
tives of other local residents. In smaller units, individual citi-
zens are likely to think they have a greater share of local
power. The resulting sense of "citizen effectiveness" 4 may lead
to more participation, which, by reinforcing the sense of effec-
tiveness, can maintain and increase participation."
10. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-72 (1990).
11. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Is Local Government Structure in Large
Urbanized Areas Monopolistic or Competitive?, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 95, 101 (1981)
(interpreting urban concentration ratios as a measure of fragmentation). The
average metropolitan area is divided into more than one hundred local gov-
ernments, and in more populous areas there are hundreds of localities. See
Donald N. Rothblatt, Summary and Conclusions, in METROPOLITAN Gov-
ERNANCE: ANERICAN/CANADIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 433, 451
(Donald N. Rothblatt & Andrew Sancton eds., 1993).
12. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, "What About the "Ism'?" Normative and
Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1312-
18 (1994) (noting that contemporary arguments for federalism rely on values
associated with local autonomy).
13. See, e.g., Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv.
1057, 1068-70 (1980) (advocating decentralization as a remedy for individual
powerlessness).
14. See ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 41-
42 (1973) (discussing factors that increase the likelihood of political involve-
ment by citizens)
15. See id. at 41-66.
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In short, both economic and political models of local gov-
ernment rely on small local size in making the case for decentrali-
zation of power to local units.16 Yet, although most metropolitan
areas are fragmented into a large number of relatively small
local governments, in many areas there is at least one local
government that does not fit the basic presuppositions of these
models-the big city that is often at the core of the area. First,
larger cities are, well, larger. They take up more space and are
the location of more activities, including employment. As a re-
sult, city residents may have to move further and may incur
greater commutation costs if they try to change their locality of
residence while maintaining their old jobs. Movement from the
city to the suburbs may result in a greater lifestyle change
than movement from one suburb to another, and, thus, may
constitute a greater disruption in the private life of the city
resident. In other words, the costs of exit may be greater for
city residents." As a result, from a Tieboutian perspective they
ought to be less able to satisfy their preferences for local public
actions. By the same token, if exit is more difficult, then the
threat of exit may be less of a constraint on local government
action.
In addition, cities are likely to be more diverse, in terms of
race, class, and land uses than suburban local governments.
There is, therefore, likely to be much greater heterogeneity of
preferences concerning local tax, service, and regulatory poli-
cies. A higher percentage of big city residents are likely to be
dissatisfied with their local government's decisions than are
residents of smaller, more homogeneous localities. Moreover,
internal conflicts may make big cities less capable of acting like
self-interested Tieboutian localities in the ongoing metropoli-
tan interlocal competition to attract and retain the mobile tax-
payers needed to finance local spending programs.
With interlocal movement, or "exit," potentially less avail-
able to city residents, political participation, or "voice" becomes
16. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 392-405 (1990) (discussing the interplay
of economic and political models in thinking about local autonomy).
17. To be sure, the steady hemorrhaging of central city populations over
the last half-century demonstrates the capacity of city residents to exit to the
suburbs. My point is simply that relocation from the municipality may be
harder for big-city residents than for their suburban counterparts, and, thus,
in the big-city setting, the "consumer-voter" mobility that drives the Tiebout
model may be less effective in achieving the efficiency and responsiveness
goals of local autonomy.
[Vol. 82:503506
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more important.' 8 Yet the large populations that define big
cities reduce the possibilities of voice as well. As political sci-
entist Robert Dahl once put it in making the participationist
case for local autonomy, 'To regard the government of New
York as a local government is to make nonsense of the term."19
For cities like New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago, large
size reduces the potential for participation associated with lo-
cal autonomy.
Big cities, thus, are less likely to provide the benefits that
economic and political theorists find in the local government
system. One solution might be to break up larger cities into
smaller cities, by encouraging individual neighborhoods to se-
cede or dissolving the big cities outright. 0 Secessions and dis-
solutions, however, have been rare.2 Alternatively, cities could
be restructured to provide for the decentralization of signifi-
cant service, tax, or regulatory responsibilities to neighbor-
hoods or other discrete communities within cities. Although
there was considerable public interest in such neighborhood
governance in the late 1960s and early 1970s,' very little in
the way of big-city decentralization actually occurred.23
18. See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (developing "exit" and
"voice" models of collective decisionmaking).
19. Robert Dahl, The City and the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. Sci.
REV. 953, 968 (1967); see also DOUGLAS YATES, THE UNGOVERNABLE CITY:
THE POLITICS OF URBAN PROBLEMS AND POLICY MAKING 178 (1977) (noting
that city hall may be too large an entity to be responsive to neighborhood con-
cerns).
20. Despite the broad support for small local units, neither political nor
economic advocates have given much consideration to breaking up large lo-
calities. See Briffault, supra note 16, at 429 & n.358 (identifying proponents
of dissolution and limited growth). For a direct discussion of secession from
the law and economics perspective, see James M. Buchanan & Roger L. Faith,
Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Towards a Theory of Internal Exit, 77
AM. ECON. REV. 1023, 1023-1031 (1987).
21. See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan
Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas
of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 776-77 & nn.16-17 (1992)
(identifying the limited instances of secessions).
22. See, e.g., MILTON KOTLER, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT: THE LOCAL
FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1969) (arguing for decentralized local con-
trol).
23. For a comprehensive review of the decentralization programs of the
late 1960s and early 1970s, see DOUGLAS YATES, NEIGHBORHOOD DE_
MOCRACY: THE POLITICS AND IMPACTS OF DECENTRALIZATION (1973). For a
review of more recent experiments in enhancing neighborhood participation in
big city decisionmaking, see JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH OF
19971
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The more recent development of new forms of submunicipal
political institutions, however, suggests new possibilities for
ameliorating the basic tension between the assumptions of the
Tiebout model24 and the position of big cities in the local gov-
ernment system. These new institutions-which include en-
terprise zones, tax increment finance districts, special zoning
districts, and business improvement districts-provide for a
variety of territorially based differences in taxation, services,
or regulation within individual cities. To be sure, none of these
structures is a full-fledged government or provides for the de-
centralization of significant city-government decisionmaking to
the neighborhood or community level. Nevertheless, each
structure represents a departure from the traditional centralized
"big city."
This Article examines these new sublocal structures and
considers their implications for the applicability of the Tiebout
model to larger cities. Part II describes the new structures and
analyzes how they depart from traditional forms of local gov-
ernment. Part III draws the structures together and suggests
that, despite their limitations and their differences from each
other, they may represent a new type of urban governance.
Part IV then turns to the interactions of the new structures
with the Tiebout model. By implementing these structures,
city governments may be able to increase their responsiveness
to residents' preferences and contribute to urban fiscal well-
being. Moreover, because the scope of sublocal autonomy pro-
vided is relatively limited, cities that use these structures can
still constrain the tendency, endemic to the Tiebout model, for
local units to impose costs on their neighbors. On the other
hand, these structures may increase service inequalities within
cities, and they tend to enhance the place of private interests in
urban governance. This Article concludes that these structures
URBAN DEMOCRACY (1993).
24. The Tiebout model is, obviously, a highly idealized model. Even in the
suburbs the costs of relocation are greater than the model suggests and oper-
ate to hamper the overall efficiency of the system. The Tiebout model tends to
favor the interests of those who can relocate more easily over those whose
mobility is more limited. Moreover, it has the effect of giving the marginal
consumer-voter-that is, the person who can threaten to leave-a greater impact
on local decisions than the resident more tightly tied to the locality. See Brif-
fault, supra note 16, at 415-25 (examining the political shortcomings of the
economic theory of local autonomy). This Article neither defends nor damns
the Tiebout model; rather, its sole focus is the applicability of the model to




may be able to improve the efficiency of local operations, but
they are unlikely to improve the prospects for political partici-
pation by ordinary citizens in big-city governance.
H. FOUR STRUCTURES OF SUBLOCAL GOVERNANCE
A. ENTERPRISE ZONES
Based on a proposal of Peter Hall, a British geographer
and urban planning expert, that was embraced by Sir Geoffrey
Howe, economic spokesman for the British Conservative Party,
enterprise zones became a central component of Republican
Party urban policy in the 1980s.25 The original theory of the
enterprise zone was that the radical deregulation of business
activity within a territorially defined economically depressed
area of a city would stimulate the development of enterprise
within the area. In theory, by striking the shackles of oppres-
sive taxation and regulation, enterprise zones would encourage
private economic activity and cause blighted inner-city areas to
flourish without further government intervention.2 6 The Reagan
and Bush administrations repeatedly pressed for federal en-
terprise zone legislation, but Congress resisted as long as the
Republicans held the White House." Although blocked at the
national level, however, enterprise zone laws were enacted by
roughly three-quarters of the states in the 1980s, leading to the
creation of at least five hundred active zones.
28
25. On the intellectual origins of the enterprise zone, see Stuart M. But-
ler, ENTERPRISE ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES (1981); Sir Geoffrey
Howe, Liberating Free Enterprise: A New Experiment, in NEW TOOLS FOR
ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT: THE ENTERPRISE ZONE, DEVELOPMENT BANK, AND
RFC 13, 13-24 (George Sternlieb & David Listokin eds., 1981); Michael Alan
Wolf, Enterprise Zones: A Decade of Diversity, in FINANCING ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: AN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE 123, 125-30 (Richard D. Bing-
ham et al. eds., 1990).
26. See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler, The Conceptual Evolution of Enterprise
Zones, in ENTERPRISE ZONES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
27-32 (Roy E. Green ed., 1991) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE ZONES].
27. Under the Clinton Administration, Congress enacted a significantly
modified version of the enterprise zones, renaming them "empowerment
zones" as if to underscore their departure from the original enterprise zone
concept. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
107 Stat 312, 543-556 ) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§1391-1397D (1994)) (amending
the Internal Revenue Code to provide for the designation and treatment of
empowerment zones).
28. See Enid Beaumont, Enterprise Zones and Federalism, in ENTERPRISE
ZONES, supra note 26, at 41.
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The state-authorized enterprise zones differ significantly
from each other, as well as from the classic enterprise zone
concept. Enterprise zones are rarely the "self-executing" free
ports Hall and Howe envisioned.29 Most enterprise zones make
extensive use of tax abatements, reductions, and credits, 30 but
regulatory relief is now a minimal component of enterprise
zone programs. 31 Instead, many enterprise zones provide for a
"more active or interventionist governmental presence" in de-
pressed areas, "including the provision of loans and venture
capital, land assembly to facilitate new uses of land, and public
investment in physical infrastructure. 32 Many enterprise zones
have their own administrative or management structures. These
are generally public-private collaborations that provide techni-
cal assistance to zone businesses, help firms work with public
and private sources of capital, and engage in marketing and
promotion activities on behalf of firms in the zone and the zone
as a whole.33 According to studies, enterprise zones that have
more interventionist management structures, provide more
services to firms, and engage in more zone marketing and pro-
motion have done better in promoting economic development
than those that rely primarily on targeted tax breaks and limited
regulatory relief.34 Indeed, one study reported that "the most
29. See Richard C. Elling & Ann Workman Sheldon, Determinants of En-
terprise Zone Success: A Four State Perspective, in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra
note 26, at 136, 138 (discussing employment of interventionist enterprise zone
practices).
30. See PETER EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE:
STATE AND LOCAL EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
188-99 (1988) (examining implementation of various state enterprise zones).
3L See Rodney A. Erickson & Susan W. Friedman, Comparative Dimen-
sions of State Enterprise Zone Policies, in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 26
at 155, 164 (observing that "[riegulatory relief appears to be used rarely");
Franklin J. James, The Evaluation of Enterprise Zone Programs, in EN-
TERPRISE ZONES, supra note 26 at 225, 232 (claiming that "the concept of ex-
tensive deregulation as a development incentive is defunct"). According to
Erickson and Friedman:
The regulatory relief that has been offered tends to be procedural
rather than substantive, and is usually in the form of one-stop permits,
fast-tracking, and fee reductions. When there has been substantive
relief, it has usually been limited to assistance with zoning changes,
variances that may well have been granted without an official policy
of regulatory relief.
Erickson & Friedman, supra, at 164.
32. Elling & Sheldon, supra note 29, at 136-37.
33. See id. at 151.
34. See id. at 152 (claiming that the use of interventionist techniques is
superior to the classic enterprise zone model); see also Erickson & Friedman,
[Vol. 82:503510
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important role of an enterprise zone program may be as a tool
for marketing otherwise relatively undesirable areas to poten-
tial employers or as a means of organizing development activi-
ties in the community."35
Enterprise zones have received mixed reviews in terms of
their ability actually to stimulate economic development,36 but
analysts tend to agree that their use of geographic targeting
within cities represents a distinctive break from prior economic
development programs.3 7 Although enterprise zones in prac-
tice have "much in common" with other approaches to economic
development, "they are unique in one major respect: [they are]
[p]olicies... limited to particular geographic areas."38 Enter-
prise zone programs are "highly unusual" in concentrating
their resources in small geographic areas-usually, although
not exclusively, within cities-and in making tax and other in-
centives "available to all eligible establishments within a zone
as a matter of right.... irrespective of need."39 Regardless of
their economic development effects, enterprise zones are sig-
nificant from a legal and institutional perspective.40 Their use
of discrete sublocal territorial units as a focus for capital and
technical assistance, their departure from locality-wide levels
of taxation, and their deployment of a mixed public-private
administrative structure to work with area businesses are
noteworthy developments in urban governance.
supra note 31, at 174-75 (emphasizing the utility of state-local and public-
private partnerships); James, supra note 31, at 238 (noting that zone marketing
is a determinant for success).
35. Patrick G. Grasso & Scott B. Crosse, Enterprise Zones: Maryland
Case Study, in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 26, at 122, 134; see also
INTERNATIONAL DOWNTOWN ASsOcIATION, SUCCESSFUit DOWNTOWN DE-
VELOPMENT, DESIGN & MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS: A COMPENDIUM OF
FUNDING TOOLS & TECHNIQUES 52 (1991) (observing that enterprise zones are
most successful as part of an overall local development plan).
36. See, e.g., EISINGER, supra note 30, at 194-99 (describing the lackluster
results of various states' enterprise zones).
37. See, e.g., Susan B. Hansen, Comparing Enterprise Zones to Other
Economic Development Techniques, in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 26, at
7, 23.
38. Id. at 7.
39. James, supra note 31, at 226.
40. For an examination of some of the legal issues posed by enterprise
zones, see Michael Allan Wolf, Enterprise Zones Through the Legal Looking
Glass, in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 26, at 58, 58-74.
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B. TAX INCREMENT FINANCE DISTRICTS
Tax increment financing (TIF) emerged in the 1970s, fol-
lowing cutbacks in federal urban aid programs, as a major
state and local tool for financing urban development.41 It is a
technique for enabling the increased revenue produced by eco-
nomic growth in discrete urban areas to cover the costs of the
public investment intended to stimulate new private invest-
ment in those areas. Under TIF, a geographically defined sec-
tion of a city is designated as blighted or distressed. The as-
sessed property valuation in the area is frozen for a specified
period of time, typically ranging from ten to twenty-five years. 42
Property tax revenues generated at that level of valuation will
continue to flow into local government coffers; any additional
revenues resulting from the growth in property values in the
area is reserved to pay for economic development programs for
the area.43
The TIF authority, either the municipality itself or a local
economic development entity, is authorized to acquire and
clear land within the district, construct public facilities or
parking lots, or install utilities, repair streets, engage in land-
scaping, and undertake other activities intended to make the
area more attractive to private investment. 44 The assumption
is that this public spending will encourage new private eco-
nomic activity in the district that will drive up property values
and generate additional tax revenues. These revenues are
earmarked to pay the debt incurred by the TIF authority to fi-
nance the district improvements. In other words, district im-
provements are financed by the incremental property tax reve-
nue resulting from the district improvements.
The use of TIF is frequently tied to the plans of particular
developers or firms contemplating investments in a district.
The municipality or development authority will often work
closely with particular private developers in formulating and
implementing a plan for a particular TIF zone.45
41. See James R. Paetsch & Roger Y. Dahlstrom, Tax Increment Financ-
ing: What It Is and How It Works, in FINANCING EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
AN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 25, at 81, 82.
42. See id. at 83.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See generally id. at 82-98 (noting that thorough market analysis and
concrete development or redevelopment plans are necessary to achieve the
goals behind TIF); EISINGER, supra note 30, at 182-88 (describing a TIF zone
[Vol. 82:503
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Seen as "development that pays for itself,"46 tax increment
financing is widely popular and authorized by approximately
three-quarters of the states.47 At the end of the 1980s there
were more than one thousand cities with TIF districts,48 al-
though most of them were concentrated in California and in
the upper Middle West states of Minnesota, Michigan and Wis-
consin.49 Minneapolis has been a particularly heavy user of the
TIF technique. Of eighty-five downtown redevelopment proj-
ects undertaken between 1980 and 1991, thirty of them bene-
fited from tax increment financing. Between 1986 and 1990,
forty-three percent of the city's funds for economic development
came from tax increment financing, and in 1990, TI districts
accounted for thirteen percent of the tax base."
Although state laws generally limit the availability of tax
increment financing to "blighted" or otherwise economically
distressed neighborhoods, many TI districts are located in
downtown business areas.51 TB? programs focus less on rede-
veloping the slums and more on providing cities with an addi-
tional tool for competing with other cities for new investment.
This development was, to some extent, inevitable. Unlike en-
terprise zones, which provide for outside assistance to a sublocal
area via tax breaks, direct investment, or technical assistance,
TI relies on new revenues generated within a district, and
truly blighted areas are less likely to generate those revenues.
Moreover, because of TIF's reliance on bonded debt to provide
in Madison, Wisconsin, which induced Rayovac to keep its corporate head-
quarters in the area).
46. Paetsch & Dahlstrom, supra note 41, at 82.
47. See INTERNATIONAL DOWNTOWN ASSOCIATION, supra note 35, at 45
(noting that 37 states authorize TIF).
48. See Paetsch & Dahlstrom, supra note 41, at 86 (ranking states by the
number of cities with TIF districts).
49. See id.; see also JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN
FORTUNEs: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 174-75 (1987) (discussing TIF
in California); Richard Child Hill, Crisis in the Motor City: The Politics of
Economic Development in Detroit, in RESTRUCTURING THE CITY: THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 80, 110 (Susan S. Fainstein et
al., eds., 1983) (discussing role of TIF in Detroit downtown redevelopment);
Alex Schwartz, Rebuilding Downtown: A Case Study of Minneapolis, in
URBAN REVITALIZATION: POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 189-95 (Fritz W. Wagner et
al., eds., 1995) (discussing role of TIF in Minneapolis's downtown revitalization
projects).
50. See Schwartz, supra note 49, at 188, 190.
51. See Paetsch & Dahlstrom, supra note 41, at 95-96 (noting that slums
and blighted areas do not generate large incremental revenues relative to
growing suburbs and downtown areas).
1997]
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the initial funding for district improvements, localities have an
incentive to use TIF for the redevelopment of just those areas
most likely to draw private investment. This minimizes the
risk that the TIF district will be unable to cover its debt. De-
velopment advisers note that TIEF "is particularly suited to
large, high impact projects because these can be expected to
bring in sufficient profits .... Income-generating projects such
as shopping centers, hotels, industrial parks and large mixed use
projects have been the most popular facilities financed with TIEF."52
As a geographically targeted economic development device,
TIF resembles the enterprise zone. TIF gives significance to
the sublocal district in providing that the additional tax reve-
nues generated by new development are encapsulated in the
district to pay for the public costs of stimulating development.
Property within a TIF district is assessed in the same manner
and at the same rate as other property in the city-but the in-
cremental tax revenues produced by new development are ef-
fectively returned to the district to finance the cost of the dis-
trict's infrastructure. 53 For the purposes of financing new
development, the TIF district thus functions as a self-contained
sublocal structure embedded within the broader city.
C. SPECIAL ZONING DISTRICTS
Special zoning districts are amendments to zoning ordi-
nances that provide detailed land use rules "tailor-made to
some particular set of circumstances in a particular area."'
They differ from traditional zoning districts in their explicit fo-
cus on the needs and characteristics of named neighborhoods,
as well as in their detail and their focus on shaping district-
level development. By definition, all zoning involves dividing a
city into different territorial areas defined by the land uses
52. INTERNATIONAL DowNTowN ASSOCIATION, supra note 35, at 45; see
also Arthur C. Nelson & Jeffrey H. Milgroom, Regional Growth Management
and Central-City Vitality: Comparing Development Patterns in Atlanta, Georgia,
and Portland, Oregon, in URBAN REvITALIZATION: POLICIES AND PROGRAMS,
supra note 49, at 1, 27-28 (observing that TIF partially financed a downtown
waterfront festival marketplace and convention center in Portland, Oregon);
Paetsch & Dahlstrom, supra note 41, at 96 (noting that TIF is often used to
draw developers and investors to "desirable parcels in growing areas").
53. See Meierhenry v. City of Huron, 354 N.W.2d 171, 177 (S.D. 1984)
(noting that the "equality and uniformity" in taxation required by South Da-
kota's constitution does not extend to the distribution of the revenue).
54. RICHAR F. BABCOCK & WENDY U. LARSEN, SPECIAL DISTRICTS: THE
ULTIMATE IN NEIGHBORHOOD ZONING 3 (1990).
514 [Vol. 82:503
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permitted in the areas. Zoning ordinances have traditionally
been framed in terms of a few broad categories of uses-
residential, commercial, industrial or mixed-and have focused
on relatively limited aspects of land use, such as building
height and mass, type of use, and density.55 Although tradi-
tional zoning districts may be tailored to take into account the
distinctive conditions of different types of urban neighbor-
hoods, the districts are typically defined in terms of the types
of land uses permitted within them rather than by reference to
specific named neighborhoods. 6 In a city with two or more
zones of the same character-such as "two-family residential"
or "neighborhood shopping"57 -the land use rules in those dis-
tricts would be the same, even though the zones are located in
different neighborhoods.
Special zoning districts, by contrast, impose rules tailored
to the concerns of particular neighborhoods. This difference is
often reflected in the very titles of the special districts, which
typically refer not to the type of use permitted but to the
popular name of the district. As the New York Court of Ap-
peals has noted, "Special district zoning ... represents a sig-
nificant departure from [the] traditional Euclidean zoning concept
.... The districts created are not traditional zoning districts,
narrowly limited to particular uses, but broad-based plans in-
tended to preserve and enhance troubled areas.., because of
their singular characteristics .... "58
Special zoning districts are particularly common in New
York City, which created thirty-seven such districts in the
1970s and 1980s. 9 The districts were intended to steer or limit
development within the City, or to control the effects of growth
on existing land uses and on residents in the immediate area.
For example, the City created the Special Theater District to
provide incentives to developers to protect theaters in the
55. See, e.g., 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF
PLANNING AND ZONING § 8.01 (4th ed. 1997) (describing the theory of zoning
based on separation of incompatible uses); 1 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND
LAND USE CONTROLS § 1.02[5][al (1997) (describing the general provisions of
traditional zoning).
56. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.01 (3d ed. 1993)
(illustrating a standard zoning format typical of zoning ordinances).
57. CuRTIS J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 770 (3d ed. 1983)
(taing examples from the San Francisco City Planning Code).
58. Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782, 786 (1988).
59. See BABCOCK & LARSEN, supra note 54, at 5 (describing New York
City as the "undisputed monarch of special district use").
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Broadway area. 60 The Special Clinton District protects the
working-poor residents of an area expected to undergo new devel-
opment by limiting building heights, imposing tight restrictions
on building demolitions, providing special protections against
harassment of tenants, regulating the number of rooms in
apartments in new and rehabilitated buildings, and protecting
existing public parking lots.61 The Special Fifth Avenue Dis-
trict sought to "preserve what planners perceived as the tradi-
tional ambiance of the Avenue" by imposing restrictions on
signs and banners and precisely defining limits on the use of
the ground floors of district buildings. 2 The Special Garment
Center District restricts the conversion of manufacturing space
to office use in order to maintain the economic viability of ap-
parel production in the area. 63
San Francisco and Chicago also created special zoning dis-
tricts in order to control development and buffer its conse-
quences for particular communities. San Francisco's special
zoning districts are intended to preserve neighborhoods that
combine small-scale retail uses and residential units against
an influx of fast-food restaurants and economic pressures to
convert residences to commercial or office uses.6r In Chicago, a
special manufacturing district restricts new residential and re-
tail development to assure industrial firms enough space to ex-
pand their facilities.65
60. See id. at 25-38 (describing the history and role of the Special Theater
District as the first special zoning district in New York City).
61. See id. at 45-47, 49-52 (noting that the Special Clinton District was
designed to protect the availability of affordable housing).
62. See id. at 57-61. Creation of this district was sparked by the influx of
airline offices and branch bank offices on Fifth Avenue. These were seen as
threatening the district's luxury shopping facilities. See id. at 55-56. The
Special Fifth Avenue District and the Special Theater District subsequently
became subdistricts of the Special Midtown District. See id. at 155-56.
63. See id. at 90-91. Other districts have focused on the protection of
distinctive neighborhoods-albeit not areas that could qualify for historic or
landmark status: The Special Grand Concourse District, thus, imposes special de-
sign controls, including detailed prescriptions of sign colors, canopy materials,
and the size of window graphics, in order to enhance the appearance of the
Bronx's principal boulevard. See id. at 107-10.
64. The districts, in such neighborhoods as Castro, North Beach, and Sac-
ramento Street, impose special controls on residential conversions and special
parking, traffic, and anti-litter rules. See id. at 113-23.
65. See id. at 131. One effect of the district has been to limit the threat to
manufacturing that can arise when new residents complain about the "noise,
bad odors, or any of the other conditions associated with industry" and seek
the stricter enforcement of local public health codes that are burdensome to
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By tailoring land use regulation to conditions specific to
particular neighborhoods, special district zoning departs sig-
nificantly from the traditional zoning tenets of citywide uni-
formity and standards based on type of land use rather than
distinctive neighborhood conditions. 66 Special district zoning,
in effect, creates miniature, district-specific zoning ordinances
for particular neighborhoods. Although special zoning districts
are created by city governments and do not entail district-level
political or administrative structures, in practice neighborhood-
level associations of residents or businesses play an important
role in the initial decision to enact a special zoning district.
Similarly, neighborhood groups, by lobbying and voicing their
complaints to city agencies, are taking a leading role in enforcing
district rules.67  Thus, the special zoning districts provide a
form of sublocal regulation, sublocal initiation, and sublocal
implementation of district-specific land use rules.
D. BUSINESS IMI'ROVEmENT DISTRICTS
A business improvement district (BID) is a territorially
defined district within a city which is created by that city to fi-
nance and to provide services within the district. The city
subjects property in the district to additional taxation, and the
revenues thereby generated are reserved to fund services and
improvements within the district. Frequently, the city will
create some administrative or advisory body, composed of rep-
resentatives of businesses or landowners within the district, to
manage the operations of the BID. In some states, the mem-
bers of this body will actually be elected by district property
owners;68 in other states they will be appointed by the city gov-
ernment. 69 Although the BID is based on longstanding legal
industry. See id. at 129.
66. See id. at 3 (noting that special district zoning focuses on the "trees"
rather than the "forest").
67. See id. at 121-22, 139-42 (describing the effects of individual and
group resident involvement on the permanence and enforcement of special
district rules).
68. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-m(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997)
(requiring that a majority of the board be composed of owners and that ten-
ants be represented).
69. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:2740.3.D(1) (West 1988) (providing
that the mayor shall appoint members subject to approval by the city council
and that five members shall be selected by the mayor from eight nominated by
the chamber of commerce); TEx. Loc. Govr. CODE ANN. § 375.064 (West
Supp. 1997) (providing for the recommendation of new members for the gov-
erning board by the board itself, subject to the approval of the city council).
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structures, such as the special assessment and the special dis-
trict, the device caught on and began to spread rapidly only in
the last two decades. 70 Most states have adopted BED-enabling
legislation,71 and there are about a thousand BEDs in the
United States.72
BIDs undertake a wide variety of activities. Most focus
their attention on such traditional municipal services as sani-
tation, street maintenance, and public security. 3 They do not
replace municipal activities in these areas; rather they sup-
plement the services actually provided by the municipality.
For example, in an area where the municipality picks up gar-
bage three times a week, the BED may arrange for garbage
pick-ups on two additional days. BEDs may provide these
services by hiring their own workers, contracting with private
providers, or financing the city government's provision of addi-
tional services within their districts.74 Some BIDs operate
parking facilities, maintain public amenities, and undertake
capital programs intended to improve streetscapes by installing
new streets and sidewalks, fountains, street lights, benches,
and other forms of street furniture.75 A few BIDs attempt to
address social problems, particularly homelessness. New
York's Times Square BEID provides services to the homeless
and works with the Partnership for the Homeless "to assist
homeless people who are ready to get off the streets." 6 Other
BIDs, however, are primarily interested in rousting the home-
less from doorways and encouraging panhandlers to move
70. See Janet Rothenberg Pack, BIDs, DIDs, SIDs, SADs: Private Gov-
ernments in Urban America, BROOKINGS REv., Fall 1992, at 18, 18 (noting
that few BIDs existed before 1980).
71. See David J. Kennedy, Note, Restraining the Power of Business Im-
provement Districts: The Case of the Grand Central Partnership, 15 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 283, 290 & n.61 (1996) (citing enabling statutes in forty states).
72. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Houstoun, Jr., Business Improvement Districts,
20 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMMENTARY 4, 5 (1996) (stating that there are
between 1,000 and 2,000 BIDs in the United States and Canada).
73. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CITIES WITHIN CITIES:
BusINEss IMPROVEMENT DITRICTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MICROPOLIS
78-84 (1995).
74. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Houstoun, Jr., Betting on BIDs, URB. LAND,
June 1994, at 13, 14-16 (describing the approaches taken by five different cities);
INTERNATIONAL DOWNTOWN ASSOCIATION, COMPARISON CHART-SELECTED
DOWNTOWN MANAGEMENT DISTRICTS 41-42 (on file with author).
75. See Houstoun, supra note 74, at 13, 14-16.
76. 1 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF BusINEss SERVICES, NEw YORK
CITY BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 59 (August 1996).
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along." New York's Grand Central BID became embroiled in
controversy in 1995 when homeless people alleged that the
BID's homeless outreach workers were functioning as a "goon
squad" to drive homeless people from the district.
7
Although all BID activities are justified in terms of their
ability to improve the business climate within the districts,
some BIDs also engage in activities directly intended to attract
and retain business, or to draw customers to district firms.
This can include sponsoring festivals and other special events,
putting up Christmas lights, publishing direct mail advertising
and informational brochures, and providing management as-
sistance to district firms. 9 BIDs may engage in strategic
planning, or attempt to create distinct, marketable images for
their districts. As part of shaping a district's image, some
BIDs may adopt uniform street lighting and public signage
rules for their districts;"0 attempt to influence the signs and fa-
cades of private owners;81 lobby city hall for more vigorous en-
forcement of city sanitary and design codes and rules against
street vendors; 2 or seek adoption of special antivendor ordi-
nances for their districts.8 3
Because BIDs are financed by taxes on property or busi-
nesses within the districts, most state laws condition the for-
mation of a district on some proof that the property or business
owners endorse the supplemental taxation. The state may require
77. See Heather MacDonald, BIDs Really Work, THE CITY JOURNAL,
Spring 1996, at 29, 40 (describing Portland's, Phoenis, and Baltimore's ap-
proaches to social problems).
78. See Kennedy, supra note 71, at 321-24 (describing the "goon squad"
scandal).
79. See generally, NYCOM, GUIDE TO NEW YORK STATE BuSINESs
IMPROVEMENT DISTPcrS (1996) (covering 60 BDs within the state of New
York).
80. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40-56-71 (West 1992) (allowing for prior
approval for construction or alteration of building and structure facades).
81. See, e.g., Janet Allon, Superstore Asked to Make Its Sign A Bit Less
Super, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1997, § 13 (The City), at 6 (describing the at-
tempts of a BED to influence change in signage described as "overkill").
82. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Kaleidoscopic Astor Place: Will The Funk
go?, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1996, at § 13 (The City), at 6 (noting impact of BID
on sidewalk peddlers); Douglas Martin, Veterans Fighting for Right to Peddle
in Midtown, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1995, at B3 (describing a lobbying battle over
a permanent ban on unrestricted peddling by veterans); 34th St. BID Sues
Over Newstand, 39 REAL EST. WRLY., Feb. 25, 1993, at 5B, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws file.
83. See, e.g., Fanelli v. City of Trenton, 641 A.2d 541, 542-44 (N.J. 1994)
(upholding an anti-vendor ordinance passed pursuant to SID enabling legislation).
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that a petition calling for the creation of the BID be signed by a
significant fraction of property or business owners within the
district before the city can create the district.' Other states
may permit the city to initiate the process of BID formation,
but enable district landowners or businesses to block the dis-
trict if some substantial fraction of those subject to taxation
sign a petition protesting the creation of the district.85 Typi-
cally, the process of creating the BID is initiated by landowners
or businesses within the proposed district. A neighborhood
chamber of commerce or a merchants' association will propose
boundaries of the district, develop the BID program, and for-
mulate its assessment structure. 6 In New York, the New York
City Partnership found that, notwithstanding state law that
implies that the city government takes the lead in creating
BIDs, 7 "property owners.., have been the initiators of the
BID, not the Mayor or the City Council."88 The level of assess-
ment within the district generally follows the recommendation
of the district property owners or businesses subject to tax.
This assessment is formally imposed and collected by the city
government, and it is treated as a municipal tax for many legal
purposes. 8
9
84. See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 36621(a) (West Supp. 1997)
(requiring submission of a written petition signed by property owners who will
pay more than 50% of assessments to be levied in the proposed district).
85. See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. ANN. § 223.117(2)(c) (1993) (providing that
improvement plan will be terminated when written objections are made from
property owners upon whom more than 33% of assessments is levied).
86. See, e.g., Houstoun, supra note 74, at 14, 16 (listing the common key
elements of BIDs and discussing various BID structures).
87. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-d(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (stating
that legislative body of a municipality or its chief executive officer may pro-
vide for preparation of a district plan, or, alternatively, this may be done upon
submission of a written petition from property owners).
88. NEW YORK CITY PARTNERSHIP, THE BID MANUAL: ESTABLISHING AND
MANAGING A BUSINESS LIPROVEMNT DISTRICT 5 (1995). Similarly, the New
York City Department of Business Services-the agency responsible for over-
seeing the City's BIDs-reports that "no BID effort will succeed without the
active support of a local sponsoring organization which is willing to undertake
the work." NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF Bus. SERVICES, ESTABLISHING AND
OPERATING A BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE 1
(1996).
89. BID assessments are compulsory for all property owners or busi-
nesses in the district who are subject to assessment, including those who filed
a written protest against the formation of the BID. Moreover, as a general
rule, failure to pay a BID assessment subjects a property owner to the same
penalties, including fines, the filing of a lien, and sale to pay for delinquency,
that apply in the event of nonpayment of property taxes. See, e.g., Henry E.
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The BID, thus, combines elements of the enterprise zone,
the TIEF district, and the special zoning district. Like these
other devices, the BID constitutes a departure from citywide
uniformity of taxation, spending, and land use regulation.
Like the TIEF and the special zoning district, the creation of the
BID reflects both district-level initiation and municipal gov-
ernment action. The BID employs the TIF device of encapsu-
lating some portion of district-generated revenues for the dis-
trict. But unlike an enterprise zone, which cuts taxes within a
zone, or a TIF district, which simply channels the additional
revenues created by growth back to the district, the BID relies
on supplemental assessments within the district to finance the
BID's services. Like the more interventionist enterprise zones,
most BIDs have some form of sublocal governance structure,
although the decisions of BID boards are either nominally ad-
visory or are subject to city oversight. Unlike any of the other
bodies, BIDs devote a considerable portion of their resources to
funding the types of public services-sanitation, street mainte-
nance, and especially security-traditionally provided by mu-
nicipal governments.
III. A NEW PARADIGM?
Do these four developments in local government structure
add up to a new mode of sublocal governance? Arguably not.
There are obvious and considerable differences among the four
types of entities. Some, like the TIF district and the enterprise
zone, are devices to promote economic development; in con-
trast, the special zoning district is often used to limit develop-
ment and buffer residents or businesses from market-driven
changes. The enterprise zone cuts taxes and, more modestly,
regulation. The TIF district leaves the level of taxation intact
while channeling the revenues produced by growth back to the
district. The special zoning district increases district-specific
regulation. The BID increases taxes and sometimes increases
(Hank) Turner, Economic Improvement Districts at Work in Oregon, in 3
DOWNTOWN INFORMATION at 17 (Oregon Downtown Dev. Ass'n, 1988). Assess-
ments on district property or district businesses are the primary, but not the
sole, source of BID funds. See Pack, supra note 70, at 20; PITTSBURGH
DOWNTOWN PARTNERSHIP, SURVEY OF BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISmICTS-
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (on file with author). Other sources of funds include
voluntary payments from tax-exempt property owners, funds generated by
charges for district operations, the sale of district services, and grants and




regulation, but is primarily focused on the provision of tradi-
tional municipal services.
Moreover, many of these structures have less to do with
governance than with targeted assistance to particular firms
and interests or the manipulation of legal categories. TIFs
may be created to provide tax-exempt financing for develop-
ers.90 Similarly, BIDs may be established to assure urban
shopping mall developers that there will be a higher level of
public services for their projects and, thus, reduce the risk of
their investment. 91 Some special zoning districts have been so
focused on specific projects that they are tantamount to illegal
"spot zoning."92 Others are created with little more than the
political purpose of according an ethnic group formal city rec-
ognition.93 Beyond the assistance to developers, TIFs are
popular with city governments because they enable the cities to
shift part of the cost of financing development to other local
governments. Much of the tax revenue foregone by freezing
TIF-district assessed valuation would have been paid to county
governments or to school, library, or other special districts with
jurisdiction over property in the TIF district. In effect, the TIF
device enables the municipal government to force these other
local units to contribute to economic development projects.94
Similarly, in some situations a BEID may be established to enable a
90. See, e.g., Paetsch & Dahlstrom, supra note 41, at 96 (describing a TIF
district created to obtain the funds needed to provide the infrastructure for
new Sears, Roebuck headquarters); see also Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 924
S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1996) (describing a district created pursuant to Missouri's
Neighborhood Improvement Act to provide tax exempt financing for a golf
course). Of course, the creation of local government units in order to help pri-
vate developers is nothing new. Local governments generally can obtain tax-
exempt financing to cover the costs of providing public infrastructure to pri-
vate developments and thereby make those developments more marketable.
See, e.g., NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INsTITUTIONS 26-27 (1994) (citing several exam-
ples in which developers used special districts to finance start-up costs and to
fund infrastructure).
91. See Edward T. Rogowsky & Ronald Berkman, New York's Outer Borough
Development Strategy: Case Studies in Urban Revitalization, in URBAN
REVITALIZATION, supra note 49, at 84-91.
92. See BABCOCK & LARSEN, supra note 54, at 104-06.
93. See id. at 65-70.
94. See, e.g., EISINGER, supra note 30, at 183 (noting a study that found
that 70% "of the eligible costs of development in TIF districts were in effect
borne by nomnunicipal governments"); Paetsch & Dahlstrom, supra note 41,
at 96 (observing that when TIF districts are used as a development tool they
generate tax revenue which would otherwise go to other taxing bodies in that
district).
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local government to avoid state constitutional limitations on
local tax increase, rather than create a governance structure.
95
Despite these reservations, some common themes link
these structures and suggest that together they represent the
emergence of a new form of sublocal governance. First, all four
developments mark a departure from the traditional legal and
political norm of uniformity of municipal action within a city.
Most state constitutions require that rates of taxation and
methods of assessment, particularly for property taxes, be uni-
form within a jurisdiction unless the constitution specifically
authorizes an exception.96 Enterprise zones and BIDs obvi-
ously break with the norm of uniformity of taxation.9 7 TIF's
variation from uniformity is more subtle: TIF-district property
is taxed at the same rate as property in the rest of the city but
since TIF-district incremental revenues are channeled back to
the district, the district contributes less than its proportionate
share to the municipality and other overlying local govern-
95. See, e.g., Evans v. City of San Jose, 3 Cal. App. 4th 728, 735-39 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that BID assessment was not a "special tax' within
the meaning of California's Proposition 13 and thus not subject to the re-
quirement of approval by two-thirds of local voters). BID assessments are not
always exempt from state constitutional restrictions on the level of taxation.
See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW. § 980-k(b) (McKinney 1997) (stating district charges
are to be included in the total amount a municipality is permitted to raise by a
tax on real property). In California, the exemption of BID assessments from
constitutional restrictions may be curtailed by a recent initiative measure,
Proposition 218, which, as of July 1, 1997, requires voter approval for many
forms of property-related fees and charges. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6,
ci (c).
96. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT INAFEDERAL SYSTEM 267-68 (4th ed. 1996).
97. Because BID charges are "assessments" used to fund benefits to prop-
erty rather than "taxes" that provide revenues for a local governments treas-
ury, state courts have generally exempted them from uniformity require-
ments. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc., 787 P.2d 39,
49 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (holding that special assessments levied against
businesses located in a BID did not violate uniformity requirement of Wash-
ington constitution); S.O.L. Club, Inc. v. City of Williamsport, 443 A.2d 410,
411-12 (Pa. Comm. W. Ct. 1982) (holding that assessments did not violate uni-
formity clause of Pennsylvania constitution because it applies only to taxes,
not assessments). I have not found any decisions that address the applicabil-
ity of uniformity clauses to enterprise zones. But cf. Wolf, supra note 40, at
66-67 (noting that some states omit property tax abatements, reductions, and
exemptions from their enterprise zone programs because of state uniformity
clauses, and that other states make tax breaks contingent on activity, like in-
creasing employment or capital investment, in addition to location in a zone in
order to accommodate uniformity clause concerns).
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ments.98 Most state zoning enabling acts require that localities
zone "in accordance with a comprehensive plan,"99 but special
district zoning can create different zoning codes for different
neighborhoods. BID design and signage rules also vary from
district to district.
Similarly, "the legal doctrine of equal service provision
presumptively obligates the [city] government to offer the same
level of service to all residents."0 0 But enterprise zones and
BIDs target different neighborhoods for higher levels of gov-
ernment investment or supplemental services. The doctrine of
equal service provision is not often judicially enforced, and in
some cities some areas are no doubt better served than others.
But this is usually attributable to bureaucratic decision rules
rather than formal city policy. In general, "municipal govern-
ments more often ... achieve a rough equivalence of service
packages among their neighborhoods." 0 1 Enterprise zones
and, especially BIDs, however, officially offer more or better or
special services to territorially defined areas.
Second, each of these initiatives tends to treat the sublocal
zone or district as a distinctive actor with a formal legal-
political identity rather than as an undifferentiated part of the
city. Enterprise zones focus on increasing economic activity in
a particular area rather than in the city as a whole. Special
zoning districts extend formal recognition to informally estab-
lished neighborhoods and reshape land use regulation in light
of the particular circumstances and concerns of the neighbor-
hoods so recognized. Even though the problems these districts
are created to address may be common to many areas of the
city, the special district's controls on building mass, store-
fronts, parking, and changes in usage are specific to a defined
neighborhood and its terms reflect the particular politics of
particular sublocal areas. According to the principal study of
98. Because property in a TIF district is nominally subject to the same
rates of taxation and assessment as property in the rest of the city, most state
courts have rejected the argument that tax increment financing violates uni-
formity of taxation requirements. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 96, at
290-95.
99. See, e.g., 2 RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 55, § 12.02.
100. Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1185, 1197 (1996).
101. ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQUALTY AND URBAN POLICY: THE DISTRI-
BUTION OF MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SERVICES 181 (1977).
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these districts, they "foster[] community pride often at the ex-
pense of citywide solutions."10
2
TIF districts and BIDs encapsulate a portion of revenues
generated within the district and reserve them for improve-
ments in and services to the district. They function to a lim-
ited but real degree as distinctive taxing and spending en-
claves within the larger city. TIF districts tend to be relatively
small and focused on financing the development of particular
parcels of land, but BEs may be used for the long-term finan-
cial support of services to and planning for whole neighbor-
hoods. Indeed, like special zoning districts, BiDs give formal
recognition to a neighborhood by name.
Third, these developments often entail some form of sublo-
cal involvement in decisions for the area. There may be neigh-
borhood-level input in the formation or operation of the sublo-
cal structure or in the enforcement of the specific sublocal
regulations. Enterprise zones frequently have their own ad-
ministrative mechanisms which include representatives of
firms and community groups within the zones. Special zoning
districts are typically enacted on the initiative of, or after ne-
gotiation with, neighborhood businesses or residential or po-
litical organizations. Once in place, the district-specific rules
and regulations give "neighborhood advocates an incredible
amount of potential power."1'3 BIDs often grow out of district-
level initiatives, and state law usually provides some opportu-
nity for a district-specific voice in a city's determination
whether to create a BD. Moreover, a city typically either es-
tablishes a board composed of representatives of interests
within the BID to advise the city government concerning BID
services, programs, and finances, or designates a group of rep-
resentatives of district property owners or businesses to man-
age BED operations.
The formal authorization of a sublocal departure from
citywide norms, the promotion of sublocal identity, the role for
sublocal political action and formal sublocal administrative or
political institutions, thus, tend to link up these diverse politi-
cal structures and support the case for treating them as a new
form of urban governance. Although they perform very differ-
ent functions and operate in different ways, these zones and
districts make sublocal areas both objects and subjects of local
102. BABCOCK & LARSEN, supra note 54, at 146.
103. Id. at 145.
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government law. Together they underscore the notion that the
sublocal area is a distinct unit of governance.
To be sure, none of these structures vests broad govern-
mental powers at the sublocal level. However, I am not claiming
that these zones and districts constitute full-fledged govern-
ments; instead I am suggesting that these four structures may
herald the emergence of the sublocal level as a new focus of
governance, especially in larger cities.
IV. SUBLOCAL STRUCTURES AND THE
TIEBOUT MODEL
A. METROPOLITANIZATION WITHIN CITIES
The development of sublocal governance institutions cre-
ates something akin to a metropolitan political structure
within big cities. These sublocal structures have elements of
the three legal prerequisites for the operation of the Tiebout
model-borders that affect the scope of services and regulation,
autonomy within those borders, and financing from sources
within those borders. All four entities operate within distinctly
defined sublocal borders that limit the availability of their pro-
grams to firms or residents within those borders. Enterprise
zones, special district zoning, and BIDs all provide a measure
of sublocal autonomy. In each case, either a board represent-
ing sublocal interests plays an important role in determining
the entity's operations, or sublocal constituents exercise influ-
ence over the district's or zone's policies--or both. In the case
of BIDs, the sublocal representatives may actually be elected
from within the district although the electorate is typically
composed of businesses or property owners rather than resi-
dents. The formal recognition of the zone or district also con-
tributes to the sense that the zone or district is an autonomous
unit within the city. Finally, TIFs and BIDs rely on sublocal
self-financing, and BIDs accord the residents within their bor-
ders a measure of sublocal autonomy as well. Indeed, by com-
bining elements of all three components of local autonomy,
BIDs bear more than a passing resemblance to Tieboutian lo-
calities. The scope of their autonomy is limited, but they pro-
vide for greater intracity variation in rules, services, and taxes
than is otherwise the norm. With these structures in place,
movement within a city can actually change the services a
resident or firm receives, the taxes it pays, and the regulations
that affect personal, business, or land use activities.
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In addition to giving new significance to intralocal mobility
within big cities, these structures may enable cities to act more
like Tieboutian localities in the interlocal competition for mo-
bile consumer-voters. Rather than cut taxes citywide, which
could impair a municipality's ability to finance its programs
and draw opposition from constituencies that benefit from city
spending, or not at all, which would make it more difficult for
the city to compete for investment, the city can use an enter-
prise zone to provide geographically limited tax breaks tar-
geted on the most depressed areas. The city can use TIF as a
targeted development-oriented tax break that does not affect
the revenues that support existing levels of service. BIDs en-
able cities to offer more or better services within commercial
districts without raising the taxes that may scare off new in-
vestment since the spending financed by BID charges is con-
trolled by business-dominated boards rather than politicians.
Moreover, by requiring that the funds that pay for the supple-
mental services BIDs provide come from firms or property
owners within the districts, use of the BID device can defuse
the charge that more public spending in business districts is
unfair to other neighborhoods. Special district zoning defuses
conflicts over the costs and benefits of development by enabling
cities to steer development away from those areas that are
most resistant while encouraging new growth generally. These
zones and districts may, thus, facilitate new investment in cities
and contribute to the cities' fiscal well-being.
Moreover, because these new structures provide sublocal
zones or districts with only limited autonomy, such sublocal
governance can avoid some of the negative aspects of the Tie-
bout model. As Tiebout himself noted, local government will be
efficient only when locally supplied public services "exhibit no
external economies or diseconomies between communities." 104
Yet local government actions frequently have impact on other
localities. 05 A locality's decision to permit new development
may enhance the local tax base but impose pollution and con-
gestion costs on adjacent localities. Conversely, a locality's de-
cision to treat a particular land use as undesirable and exclude
104. Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419.
105. As then.Justice Rehnquist once observed, "The imaginary line defin-
ing a city's corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions.
A city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its
borders." Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978).
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it 0 6 can displace the activity so excluded on to other localities
or drive up the cost of that land use throughout the region.
10 7
In the absence of some form of state or metropolitan over-
sight-and such oversight is rare-the spillover effects of local
land use regulatory decisions can be a serious problem.
The sublocal structures under review, however, lack true
autonomy. A sublocal decision, such as special district zoning
or the enhanced taxation and service provision of a BID, that
may have implications for other areas in the city generally re-
quires formal municipal enactment in order to take effect.
Similarly, if it turns out that a district action that appeared to
have a primarily sublocal impact in fact has broader conse-
quences, the municipality can repeal the regulation or curtail
the authority of the sublocal entity. In other words, if the rise
of sublocal governance structures constitutes a form of metro-
politanization within large cities, it is a metropolitanization
that includes a full-fledged metropolitan government-which is
something most metropolitan areas lack. 1°0
Although sublocal autonomy in the context of municipal
oversight and control can limit the externalities problem, the
rise of sublocal institutions could extend another unattractive
feature of the Tiebout model-interlocal service inequalities-
into the cities. The Tiebout model assumes that differences in
local public actions are primarily a reflection of the differences
in the preferences of residents. In fact, local decisions are often
based not simply on idiosyncratic tastes, but on disparities in
local fiscal capacities. Wealthier communities are simply able
to spend more per capita than poorer communities, and often
they can raise more revenue while taxing their residents at
much lower rates than poorer communities.109 With sublocal
106. These can range from sites for the treatment and disposal of hazardous
wastes to housing for low-income people, who, many localities fear, will con-
sume more in locally provided services than they pay in local taxes.
107. Although one small locality's regulatory activity may have little direct
effect on the region as a whole, local land uses can have a ripple effect. When
one locality acts to exclude a use, its neighbors may feel compelled to adopt
comparable regulations to protect themselves from the use they fear will be
diverted to them by the initial locality's regulation.
108. See DAvID RusK, CITIES WITHOUT SuBuRBs 89, 95-96 (1993) (noting
the rarity of general purpose local governments that have jurisdiction over an
entire metropolitan area).
109. See Briffault, supra note 16, at 422 & n.332 (stating that large dis-
crepancies in levels of school spending between wealthy and poor school districts
are less attributable to differences in "taste" for education than to differences
in the ability of communities to raise revenue by taxation).
[Vol. 82:503528
SUBLOCAL URBAN GOVERNANCE
governance, different neighborhoods enjoy different services.
Moreover, TIF districts and, especially, BEDs are dependent on
internally generated resources. The rise of BiDs could make
neighborhood ability and willingness to pay a new and impor-
tant factor in the distribution of public services within cities-
much as ability and willingness to pay are critical determi-
nants of interlocal differences in service expenditures.
To be sure, enterprise zones suggest a model in which the
sublocal structure could be the basis of funds from outside the
neighborhood rather than an encapsulation of neighborhood
funds. ° But in an era of highly constrained local budgets, it is
likely that BIDs and not enterprise zones will set the pattern
for the development of sublocal structures. These entities will
be of limited benefit to poor areas which, virtually axiomati-
cally, suffer from a lack of neighborhood resources. These areas
will need much greater economic growth before they can avail
themselves of sublocal structures that rely on the encapsulation of
a portion of the sublocal tax base.
To date, the intralocal service inequality problem produced
by these sublocal structures has been far less serious than the
interlocal inequalities endemic to many metropolitan areas.
TIEF districts and BIDs engage in a relatively limited range of
activities. Their programs are supplemental, and the vast bulk
of city services are provided by city governments and financed
out of general revenues. Moreover, BIDs finance their activi-
ties by raising tax rates within their districts, so that, unlike
the residents of more affluent suburbs, BID residents do not
enjoy both better services and lower tax rates. Most impor-
tantly, BEDs operate in downtown areas, central business dis-
tricts, or neighborhood business strips and, thus, provide
benefits to city residents who come into those areas for work,
shopping or entertainment, as well as to BID landowners and
residents. By attracting investment, commerce and tourism to
the BEDs from outside the city, the additional BED services con-
tribute to the city's tax base and may ultimately be a source of
revenue for the city as a whole.
Still, the potential of these devices, especially BIDs, to ex-
acerbate intralocal inequalities is there. Proposals have been
110. Even enterprise zones rely more on tax cuts and regulatory relief for
the zones than the direct infusion of public funds. Moreover, many of the tax
cuts that enterprise zones provide entail credits, abatements or reductions in
state, rather than municipal, taxes. The municipal contribution to these
zones, whether in direct assistance or tax dollars foregone, is relatively small.
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floated to extend the BID device to provide neighborhood-based
financing for parks"' or for police in affluent residential ar-
eas112 -situations in which the enhanced neighborhood services
may provide little, if any, benefit to the city as a whole. Moreover,
should the use of BIDs and comparable sublocal entities in-
crease, neighborhoods with stronger tax bases might seek to
have more public programs funded from neighborhood-based
taxes while pressing for the reduction of city-wide taxes. BID-
based services would play a relatively greater role, and intralo-
cal service inequalities, tied to intralocal wealth inequalities,
would grow. We are far from that stage now, but, should the
role of sublocal institutions dependent on sublocal revenues
grow, the Tiebout model suggests that intralocal wealth-based
service inequalities would grow, too.
B. SUBLOCAL GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATISM
These sublocal governance structures appear to improve
the fit between the Tiebout model and big cities but they are
likely to do little to increase opportunities for political partici-
pation in big cities. This is because these institutions tend to
enhance the place of private interests and the private sector in
urban governance in several ways. First, some of these insti-
tutions give the private sector a considerable formal role in
their operations. The administrative structures of enterprise
zones are typically public-private partnerships, with control
shared by representatives of business, community groups, and
state and local government. BID governing bodies are typically
dominated by representatives of property owners and busi-
nesses within the district. Indeed, many BIDs are designed to
resemble corporate firms, with property owner shareholders,
not the community as a whole, electing the board of directors.
Local public officials may also have seats on these bodies; dis-
trict residents have at most token representation. When BID
governing bodies are elected, they are elected by property own-
ers and/or businesses, not by the sublocal community as a
whole.13
111. See BIDs, PEDs, and Special Districts: A Better Way to Pay for
Parks?, GREENSENSE, Spring 1995, at 1, 1.
112. See, e.g., Joyce Purnick, Private Police Force for the Area Sets Off
Alarms on Upper East Side, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1995, at A25 (discussing
support for and opposition to proposed private security force in wealthy Upper
East Side of Manhattan).
113. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass'n, 960 F. Supp.
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Second, many of these devices are consciously created to
promote the interests of business. The goal of enterprise zones
is to facilitate business activity by lifting the burdens of regu-
lation and taxation. Even the interventionist, nonregulatory
enterprise zones primarily provide capital and technical assis-
tance to businesses, rather than assistance directly to workers
or to residents generally. TIF districts are intended to stimu-
late business investment in a particular area. BIDs provide
marketing, promotion, and strategic planning assistance to
businesses in their districts. The growth of these entities,
thus, tends to underscore the importance of business promotion
as a local government activity.1
14
Moreover, many BID advocates have sought to emphasize
the private benefits of BIDs and even to suggest that the BID
itself is a private organization."' They strive to make BIDs
sound more like private chambers of commerce or business as-
sociations than public governments-even if these associations
enjoy the governmental authority to coerce contributions from
all property owners or business within the district. 16 At a time
when the capacity of government to provide public services is
disparaged, the rhetorical tendency of BID proponents to as-
s.milate their organizations to the private sector is not surprising.
To the extent that it is accepted, the proliferation of BIDs may
augment the tendency to denigrate the public sector and to
look to privatization as a solution to urban problems.
Finally, these districts and zones shift the focus of gov-
ernment action from the city as a whole to small areas. Even
the least privately oriented sublocal structure, the special
zoning district, serves the special interests -of a particular
neighborhood. Neighborhoods are rarely microcosms of a city.
Instead, they tend to be composed of particular ethnic groups,
760, 770-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding Equal Protection Clause challenge to
New York State law assuring property owner representatives located in the
district voting control of BID governing boards).
114. Indeed, according to historian Sam Bass Warner, a "tradition of pri-
vatism" is "the most important element of our culture for understanding the
development of cities." SAM BASS WARNER, JR., THE PRIVATE CITY:
PHILADELPHIA IN THREE PERIODS OF ITS GROwTH 4 (rev. ed. 1987).
115. See, e.g., Douglas Feiden, Midtown Bonds Spark BID Controversy,
CRAIN'S NEW YORK BusINEss, April 6-12, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Allnews file (quoting the counsel to New York City's largest
BID as stating, "We're a private agency, not a city agency.").
116. See James Traub, Street Fight, NEW YORKER, Sept. 4, 1995, at 37




social or economic classes, or land uses. Neighborhood governance
may increase the sense of neighborhood distinctiveness and
make it more difficult for participants in neighborhood institu-
tions to focus on the concerns of the city a whole.'1 7  The
greater use of smaller units may increase the tendency for ur-
ban government to serve territorially concentrated interests,
rather than those of the broader city public.
Ultimately, although these structures create forms of
sublocal governance, by focusing on the interests of business,
giving businesses and property owners a preferred position in
their decisionmaking structures, and defining their missions in
terms of the enhancement of relatively narrow territorial units,
these structures do little to advance the possibilities of public
participation in big-city governance. They are certainly un-
likely to achieve the goal of political empowerment for the urban
poor that was a central theme of the neighborhood government
movement of the 1960s and 1970s.1 8
CONCLUSION
The rise of sublocal governance structures underscores two
of the central tensions in the economic and political arguments
for local autonomy.
In a system in which local units are to a considerable ex-
tent dependent on local resources for their funds, local gov-
ernment programs reflect not just the preferences, but the fis-
cal capacity, of local citizens. The Tiebout model may be right
in pointing to interlocal variation as a means for promoting re-
sponsiveness to citizen preferences, but the metropolitan mar-
ketplace is als6 marked by substantial interlocal inequalities
in tax bases and spending. The rise of sublocal governance
structures has the potential for making government in big cit-
ies more responsive to the preferences of city residents, but to
the extent that sublocal governance is based on revenues gen-
erated within the sublocal unit, greater sublocal responsive-
117. See, e.g., GERALD D. SuTTLES, THE MAN-MADE CITY: THE LAND-USE
CONFIDENCE GAME IN CHICAGO 89-90 (1990) (noting the role of "local excep-
tionalism" and "local boosterism" in the efforts of Chicago neighborhoods to
have the city officially designate them as historic or ethnically distinct areas).
118. As one commentator noted, "[olne of the main objectives of the neigh-
borhood movement" was "to organize the poor to participate more effectively
in political life." Robert H. Nelson, Private Neighborhoods: A New Directionfor the Neighborhood Movement, in LAND REFORM, AMERICAN STYLE 319, 327
(Charles C. Geisler & Frank J. Popper eds., 1984).
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ness is likely to be achievable only within business districts or
more affluent neighborhoods willing to spend additional re-
sources for additional services. Unless the benefits of sublocal
governance can be extended to areas unable to finance supple-
mental services or improvements out of their own resources,
improving the fit between the Tiebout model and big city op-
erations may increase inequality along with allocative effi-
ciency.119 The enterprise zone provides one model for coupling
sublocal governance with an infusion of outside resources. But,
given the straitened fiscal circumstances of most big cities, the
BID and not the enterprise zone is the more likely model for fa-
ture developments in big city decentralization. As a result, in
those cities in which the tax base varies significantly from
neighborhood to neighborhood, the rise of sublocal governance
in taxing and spending decisions could very well lead to greater
inequalities in service delivery.
A comparable tradeoff affects the assessment of whether
these sublocal governance structures can enhance the oppor-
tunities for political participation by ordinary citizens. The
small size of a sublocal .polity ought to facilitate participation
by the constituents of the smaller units, but the shift in power
from a larger to a smaller political unit may change the nature
of that participation, and the focus on the interests of that unit
rather than on the interests of the city as a whole can change
the nature of the deliberations of the constituents of that unit.
Smaller size can narrow the range of issues that come before the
sublocal structure and limit the range of interests entitled to
participate in the debate over those issues. Participation becomes
easier, but the value of that participation as an education in
self-government or a basis for the formation of a community of
public-spirited citizens is reduced when it is focused on the
particular concerns of a discrete neighborhood, or on promoting
the commercial interests of business or landowners. These
sublocal structures may give new voice to certain districts or
district interests, but as currently designed they are unlikely to
serve as a basis for a broader empowerment of city residents or
a transformation in the nature of big-city residents' participa-
tion in public affairs.
119. Although improved service delivery in downtown districts can have
benefits for city residents generally, there would be less justification in terms
of the interests of the city as a whole for the extension of the BID concept to
non business districts, such as affluent residential areas.
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In short, although the sublocal governance structures con-
sidered in this Article may improve the fit between the domi-
nant model of local autonomy and the organization of big cities,
they demonstrate anew the limitations of local autonomy as a
normative goal of local government law.
